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British PM John Maj or looks a mild 
and inoffensive man. It's hard to 
see him as the boss of a wrecking 
crew that has virtually demolished 
the British economy. Yet his unas­
suming exterior masks the dis­
astrou s com b in ation  of a 
fundamental aimlessness with an 
utter dogmatism about specific 
policies.
M ajor is convinced, against all 
evidence, that getting inflation 
below 2% will restore the British 
economy to good health. Along with 
his lacklustre Chancellor, Norman 
Lamont, he believes that massive 
unem ploym ent, unprecedented 
levels of bankruptcies and mounting 
numbers of house repossessions are 
a "price worth paying" to get infla­
tion down.
It was John Major as Prime Minister 
who persisted in keeping interest 
rates high, driving Britain ever 
deeper into recession. It was John 
Major as Chancellor (Treasurer) who 
in 1990 took Britain  into the 
European Monetary System (EMS) 
at the unsustainable rate of 2.95 
Deutschmarks (DM) to the pound. 
That policy was foolish then; it was 
insane in September 1992. It was per­
sisted in, despite all the growing
signs of impending disaster, at the 
expense of foreign currency reserves 
and the cred ib ility  of British 
monetary policy, until Major and 
Lamont were driven out of the Ex­
change Rate Mechanism by a tidal 
wave of selling in the markets.
Lamont forced the Treasury to stub­
bornly persist in buying sterling 
from holders who were only too 
happy to get rid of it in mid-Septem­
ber, throwing away billions of dol­
lars to support the pound. By then 
the government was the only buyer 
and its actions were futile, since they 
only served to fuel speculation and 
drive the pound down still further. 
This interventionist folly came from 
a government whose key slogan has 
been: 'You cannot buck the market'. 
This is by no means true as a general 
rule, but in this case, with an almost 
universal belief in financial markets 
in the inevitability of a devaluation 
of the pound, it makes sense.
Major and Lamont have tried to save 
themselves by accusing the German 
Bundesbank of perfidy in not inter­
vening to save the pound. But why 
should the Bundesbank throw good 
money after bad? The Germans had 
in effect offered the UK a devalua­
tion as part of an orderly realign­
ment of currencies within the EMS, 
along with the Italian Lira. The 
British government refused to con­
sider the idea. Revaluation within 
the EMS at the beginning of Septem­
ber would certainly have been a U- 
turn, but it would have maintained 
Britain's position within the EMS. 
As it is the government has been 
forced into a precipitate withdrawal, 
and it has probably wrecked the sys­
tem beyond repair.
Lamont and Major see themselves as 
victims of circumstances beyond 
their control, and their policies as 
essentially right. Given the chance, 
they would have continued to 
sacrifice the real economy to the god 
of 2.95. They are exactly like the 
m indless and rigid believers in 
'sound m oney' who sacrificed 
Britain's poor to the Gold Standard 
in the 1920s. They still insist that the 
goal of negligible inflation remains 
intact and that they will keep interest
rates at a level necessary to achieve 
it. There will be some immediate 
relief for the economy from the 
beneficial effects of the devaluation. 
But high interest rates and a macho 
round of spending cuts in the north­
ern autumn will ensure there is no 
substantial recovery.
And yet: what if Labour had won 
office back in April? Sadly, it would 
have done just as Major has done. 
The Labour leadership were all com­
mitted to the EMS and refused to 
accept that DM 2.95 was unsus­
tainable. Current Labour leader John 
Smith as Chancellor would have 
doggedly held on to an overvalued 
currency. Labour had and has no 
more clue how to handle the ex­
change rate or domestic inflation 
than the Tories. And Labour would 
have had even less credibility with 
the markets.
The only real policy alternative 
available to Labour was twofold: 
first, to admit that the pound was 
considerably overvalued against the 
mark and that Britain would seek 
realignment within the EMS; and, 
second, to insist that domestic infla­
tion be dealt with by an incomes 
policy (like the Accord) and not by 
interest rate hikes and public expen­
diture cuts. Yet those who advocated 
such policies before the April elec­
tions were informed by Labour 
'pragmatists' that they would lose 
Labour the election.
Labour lost the election. It has been 
an ineffectual opposition ever since, 
because it has had nothing of sub­
stance to say about the EMS that dif­
fered from the Tories. It has refused 
to think through the hard issues on 
policy and has accepted feeble com­
promises and positions that make it 
indistinguishable from the Tories. 
Had it honestly faced Britain 's 
problems before April, Labour could 
now take an unassailable political 
lead on the basis of having been 
proven right. Britain needs an Op­
position as never before, and it 
doesn't have one.
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